"Clinical freedom is dead, and no one need regret its passing. Clinical freedom was the right -some seemed to believe the divine right-of doctors to do whatever in their opinion was best for their patients. In the days when investigation was non-existent and treatment as harmless as it was ineffective the doctor's opinion was all that there was, but now opinion is not good enough. If we do not have the resources to do all that is technically possible then medical care must be limited to what is of proved value, and the medical profession will have to set opinion aside.
"Clinical freedom died accidentally, crushed between the rising cost of new forms of investigation and treatment and the financial limits inevitable in an economy that cannot expand indefinitely. Clinical freedom should, however, have been strangled long ago, for at best it was a cloak for ignorance and at worst an excuse for quackery. Clinical freedom was a myth that prevented true advance. We must welcome its demise, and seize the opportunities now laid out before us." So wrote John Hampton, an eminent professor of cardiology, in the BMJ in October 1983.1 I think his rather unkind obituary notice for clinical freedom was in fact premature, for if indeed clinical freedom is dead it seems reluctant to lie down. It is still frequently paraded before us (rather as with the corpse of El Cid?) in defence of some medical practice which is being challenged by a non-medical person on grounds of its doubtful effectiveness, or its undoubtedly high cost, or both.
A sharply contrasting view to Hampton's was expressed a few years earlier in a letter to the New England Journal Medicine by a doctor practising in New York State.2 He wrote: "Of late an increasing number of papers in this and other journals have been concerned with 'cost-effectiveness' of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Inherent in these articles is the view that choices will be predicated not only on the basis of strictly clinical considerations but also on economic considerations as they may affect the patient, the hospital, and society. It is my contention that such considerations are not germane to ethical medical practice.... A physician who changes his or her way of practising medicine because of cost rather than purely medical considerations has indeed embarked on the 'slippery slope' of compromised ethics and waffled priorities."
Polar positions
Although prudence suggests that it is better for outsiders like me to remain onlookers when it comes to intraprofessional disputes of this degree of intensity and on topics of this degree of sensitivity, economists are not noted for angelic reticence so I propose to join the other fools from outside the medical profession and rush into the fray.
Before The first example concerns a patient for whom there are two possible courses of treatment, the safer and more effective ofwhich would require the patient to be off work for three months, entailing a substantial loss ofincome for him and possibly putting his livelihood in jeopardy altogether. The less safe and less effective treatment entails no such risks. Which treatment do you think most doctors would offer in that situation? Would they regard it as unethical to consider these "economic considerations as they affect the patient?"
The second example concerns a patient with a stable chronic condition that has already been thoroughly investigated and is being treated conventionally. The patient has seen a TV programme describing some research which seems to suggest that a new drug works wonders for some patients with that condition, and the patient wants to be sent for investigation at the nearby regional centre where the TV programme was made. Both the patient and the doctor know that there is only a small chance that the patient will benefit, and in any case this would be a very expensive course of action for everybody. The doctor also knows that the specialist in question takes a poor view of general practitioners who send him speculative cases lacking clear indications that such referral is justified, and that the regional centre is hard pressed to cope with its workload as it is.
What do you think most doctors would do in that situation? Would they regard it as unethical to take into account these "economic considerations as they affect the hospital?"
The final example concerns an elderly woman living with relatives whose daughter has had to switch from full time to part time work to cope with the strain of looking after her, who disturbs the neighbours with her odd behaviour, and who is costing the health and personal social services a great deal of money in domiciliary support. Although it is acknowledged that the patient's own survival prospects and quality of life will be worse if she is taken into hospital, those around her will certainly be better off, and it will release a lot of scarce.domiciliary support for others to use. What do you think most doctors would do in that situation?
Would they regard it as unethical to take into account "economic considerations as they affect society"-that is, people other than the patient?
It is the observation of clinical behaviour in examples such as these that convinces me that doctors do not regard it as unethical to have regard to costs, whether these costs fall on patients, their relatives, the health service, or the community at large. And I do not regard their characteristic behaviour in each of the examples I cited as at all unreasonable. I am sure that we ordinary citizens, and indeed the courts of law, would support them in their decisions if they were challenged.
Ghost of clinical freedom
So why is clinical freedom (or, if The health economist's notion of "cost as sacrifice" (rather than cost as financial expenditure) also shows more clearly the ethical issues underlying the "clinical freedom" v "health economics" discussion. To return to the earlier example, in deciding whether the treatment of the renal patient should be sacrificed to enable the 10 heart patients to be treated or vice versa, we need a distributive ethic, or an ethic of fairness, and this has to be a society wide principle (or set of principles), preferably deeply ingrained in all citizens and in the professions that serve them.
I think Hoffenberg is right in believing that in Britain we are feeling our way to a large extent unconsciously towards what he calls a "curious, unstated and ill-defined understanding" of that kind. The health economists are trying to sharpen up and clarify the nature of that understanding, especially through the development of generalised measures of health benefit, such as the quality adjusted life year, leading to the suggestion that treatments for which the "cost per quality adjusted life year gained" is very high should be given low priority, so long as we have so many patients waiting for treatments where the cost per quality adjusted life year gained is quite low. To put it more crudely, hip replacements are a better buy than heart transplants.
Legal concepts Recently I noted that even the American courts are moving towards a similar criterion when determining whether it would be proper to initiate treatment or to withdraw treatment once initiated. The key legal concept is that of "proportionality," and the relevant dictum is: "Proportionate treatment is that which, in the view of the patient, has at least a reasonable chance ofproviding benefits to the patient which outweigh the burdens attendant to that treatment."4
The court suggested that a benefit exists when life sustaining treatment contemplates "at very least, a remission of symptoms enabling a return toward a normal functioning, integrated existence." Or, as I would put it, when the expected gain in quality adjusted life years justifies the costs.
In reviewing that difficult territory the Stanford University Medical Center Committee on Ethics made the following general observation,4 which is central to my theme: "A basic principle of medical ethics is obviously the preservation of life, which is frequently tempered by the second principle, the alleviation of suffering. A third is the injunction that physicians 'first do no harm. . .'. A fourth principle [is] respect for the autonomy of the individual patient.... A fifth fundamental principle is the concept of justice, exemplified by the effort to ensure that medical resources are allocated fairly. The final principle is truth-telling....
Because medical practice often brings these principles into conflict, resolving such conflicts is central to the art of medicine."
But it is also central to the art of health service management, which operates across a much broader range of choice than that facing any individual clinician, and which has a stronger claim to legitimacy than any clinician has when it comes to judging what broad social responsibility entails. So where does all this leave us as regards the alleged conflict between health economics and clinical freedom? According to Hoffenberg there ain't no such animal as clinical freedom in any absolute sense.
According to Hampton clinical freedom died a while back, but since it should have been strangled at birth anyway we don't need to mourn its passing. Yet the symbolic power of this apparent myth seems undiminished, and my reading ofthe situation suggests that it owes this power to its malleability. It is consistent with whatever clinicians choose to make it consistent with.
If I am right in my diagnosis the immediate task of health economists is to get our notions ofefficiency and fairness in the distribution ofthe benefits ofhealth care so deeply embedded in the clinical consciousness that they come to be thought of as wholly within the realm of clinical autonomy, and we outsiders then become redundant. I would be fearful ofworking myselfout of a job by delivering lectures such as this ifI thought that all doctors were as receptive to this way of thinking, taLking, and acting as the Hamptons and Hoffenbergs BMJ VOLUME 297 5 NOVEMBER 1988 of this world clearly are. But I have no such fears (or perhaps I should say no such hopes).
Accountability
I would like now to strike a more positive note, and I found one in Raymond Hoffenberg's book. As you would expect from someone who has spent most of his professional life simultaneously encouraging doctors to count costs as well as benefits, and encouraging managers to count benefits as well as costs, I jumped with joy when I came across this delightful passage in which Hoffenberg manages to sweep away the problem and leave us all on the same side:
"Doctors are best placed to shift the emphasis of managerial enquiry from its pre-occupation with resources and costs to health outcome or patient satisfaction. For this reason alone medical participation in management is imperative. By ensuring that resources are devoted optimally to serve the interests of patients, doctors will find that their own clinical freedom is maximised."3 So health economics actually enhances clinical freedom. There seems nothing more to be said. I just wish I could believe it. But I think that Hoffenberg has muddled up two different things. He is right in believing that if doctors absorb into their realm of action the managerial skills needed to minimise the potentially adverse effects of resource constraints their clinical practice will thereby be improved. But this does not mean that their clinical freedom has been enhanced; indeed, quite the reverse. I think Hoffenberg has been too concerned to allay the fears of his colleagues, and in resolving this ethical dilemma he has given too much weight to the relief of distress and too little to truth telling. So let me end by shifting the weight the other way.
Much of the tension between health service managers and the medical profession (and I do not mean between the government and the NHS, which is a different matter) revolves around the issue ofwho has the authority to decide and give effect to the priority setting that resource constraints make inevitable. The incursions by management into territory that has hitherto been the preserve of the medical profession, and the demands for greater accountability for the resource consequences (and even 
ANY QUESTIONS
Is an objective assessment possible ofthe effects ofadult smoking on children?
The results ofmany studies on the effects ofpassive smoking have recently been summarised in the Froggatt report. These show that passive smoking in children is associated with increased respiratory symptoms, episodes of respiratory illness, and reduced ventilatory function. Several biochemical markers have been used to discriminate between smokers and non-smokers, and these may be used as objective assessments of exposure to passive smoking in children. A recent study comparing the various biochemical tests found that the concentration of cotinine, whether measured in plasma, saliva, or urine, was the best indicator of smoking, with a sensitivity of 97% and specificity of 99%. Comparisons with the cotinine concentrations in the saliva of children who smoke show that in a household where both parents smoke the children are receiving a concentration of nicotine equivalent to 80 cigarettes a year. Concentrations of carbon monoxide measured as blood carboxyhaemoglobin or in expired air gave slightly poorer sensitivity and specificity (around 90%). A carbon monoxide monitor is, however, effective for routine use in hospital or general practice and is considerably cheaper and simpler to apply than cotinine tests. In adults it verifies whether a patient is smoking or not, while an abnormal reading nm children can be used as a basis for health education advice. These meters are available from Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) at a cost of a few hundred pounds.
Apart from the physical effects of parental smoking in increasing the probability of disease substantial evidence from studies in Britain and Norway shows that children are more likely to take up smoking if their parents, teachers, older siblings, or schoolfriends smoke. They are also greatly influenced by tobacco advertising. These effects on their future behaviour are perhaps at least as important as the direct ill effects of tobacco smoke.-HELEN DUNFORD, senior health education officer, and NOEL D L OLSEN, district medical officer, London Could the chemicals used in dry cleaning cause dermatitis to those wearing cleaned garments?
Yes in theory but not in practice. The solvents used in coin operated and commercial dry cleaning processes are derivatives of chloroethylene-that is, perchloroethylene, trifluorotrichloroethylene, or trichloroethylene. All are primary irritants but extremely volatile. When cleaning is complete the amount left on commercially cleaned garments is extremely small and will have fully evaporated a short while after removal from the closed machines. Although contact dermatitis has occurred in workers operating the equipment, no cases have been reported from wearing cleaned clothes. Other chemicals used in the process-waxes and resins for retexturing and fabric softeners-have not been reported as producing dermatitis. -ALAN B SHRANK, consultant dermatologist, Shrewsbury Cronin E. Contact dermatitis. London: Churchill Livingstone, 1980.
